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Abstract—We consider a set of n messages and a group of
k clients. Each client is privileged for receiving an arbitrary
subset of the messages over a broadcast erasure channel, which
generalizes scenario of a previous work. We propose a method
for secretly delivering each message to its privileged recipients in
a way that each receiver can decode its own messages but not the
others’. Our method is based on combining the messages using
linear network coding and hiding the decoding coefficients from
the unprivileged clients. We provide an information theoretic
proof for the secrecy of the proposed method. In particular we
show that an unprivileged client cannot obtain any meaningful
information even if it holds the entire set of coded data packets
transmitted over the channel. Moreover, in our method, the
decoding complexity is desirably low at the receiver side.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless medium is potentially vulnerable to different types
of security attacks as the information is broadcast in the air and
might be easily accessed or manipulated by an unprivileged
party. Specifically, secrecy of transmission sessions is a major
concern which implies the necessity of cryptographic methods
against eavesdroppers. On the other hand, recent advances
in cooperative networking schemes unveils the advantage of
cooperation among wireless devices as a consequence of diver-
sity in wireless channels. Despite the benefits of cooperation,
it might increase the security risks in presence of dishonest
participants. As a major class of such cooperative settings,
network coding techniques require that the wireless devices
to be enabled to listen to transmission sessions which are not
necessarily intended for them and buffer what they hear on the
channel as side information. Because of diversity in packet
reception at different users, the sender might benefit from
network coding techniques to merge multiple transmission
sessions into one [1]–[5], etc. As the users are supposed to
buffer and process some messages for which they are not
their target recipients, some mechanisms should be designed to
protect the secrecy of those messages during the cooperation.
In this paper, we consider k wireless users which are
connected to a base station and share a broadcast erasure
channel. Each client is interested in receiving an arbitrary
subset of n messages. The clients are enabled to listen to all
the transmissions over the channel and save what they receive
in their buffers. As each client might have missed some parts
of information which it needs to decode its own messages,
either the base station should retransmit the missing parts or
the clients should cooperate with each other to obtain the
missing parts. We propose a method to maintain the secrecy
of individual messages against any unprivileged party (either
those clients who are not the target recipient of that message
or any external eavesdropper). The essence of the proposed
method is to combine all the messages together at the base
station regardless of their target recipients using a special form
of random linear network coding and broadcast the resulting
packets to all the clients; Each client privately receives a set
of decoding coefficients which enables it to decode its own
messages but not the others’. In other words, the main idea
is to protect the decoding coefficients against unprivileged
parties.
A brief summary of the contribution of this paper is as
follows. We propose a method to maintain the secrecy of
transmissions over a wireless broadcast channel by coding
the messages using a special form of random linear network
coding. This paper extends the scenario discussed in [6] to a
general scenario that each client is interested in an arbitrary
subset of messages. Also we prove that using our proposed
method, the eavesdropper or any unprivileged client can not
obtain any meaningful information about the messages. More-
over, our proof implies that the field size of operations can
be kept small which substantially reduces the computational
complexity especially at the receiver side which is a crucial
improvement over [6].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II,
the position of this paper within the literature is highlighted.
In section III the proposed system is introduced and some
specifications and advantages of our proposed method is
discussed. Section IV provides a clarifying example of the
entire system. Finally, in section V, secrecy of the proposed
method is proven.
II. RELATED WORK
This paper is an extension of the work in [6], where only
eavesdroppers with bounded computational power were con-
sidered to wiretap a shared broadcast channel. In the current
paper, we provide an information theoretic proof for security
of the proposed method and we show that an eavesdropper
would not be able to obtain any meaningful information
about the protected messages. Moreover, in [6] each client is
only interested in a distinct message while the current paper
generalizes the proposed method to the scenario that each of
the k clients is interested in receiving an arbitrary subset of
n messages over a shared broadcast erasure channel. Also,
unlike [6], in this paper we operate over a field size of 2 as it
is shown that the field size is not needed to be large.
We take the security advantages of random linear network
codes (RLNC [7]) in this paper. In [8] the achievable rate
region of network coding with perfect secrecy in presence
of an eavesdropper (which is able wiretap some of the links
in a multicast scenario) is characterized. Perfect secrecy is
a strict constraint which is hardly satisfied and dramatically
degrades the throughput of a multicast network. This condition
is relaxed in [9] to a weaker security condition which is still
satisfying in a practical sense. Weakly security guarantees that
the eavesdropper can not obtain any meaningful information
about the messages. In this paper, we take this definition of
security to prove the secrecy of our method. The capacity
region with perfect secrecy constraint over a broadcast channel
is characterized in [10] and a method is proposed to achieve
the identified capacity region. Since we have relaxed the
condition of perfect secrecy, higher data rates can be achieved
using our proposed method.
On the other hand our proposed method is based on
protecting the decoding coefficients of linear combinations
of messages from eavesdroppers. Similar concept has been
considered by [11], [12] where [11] provides information
theoretic bounds and theorems to guarantee that the mutual
information between the transmitted information over the
links and respectively, the coding coefficients or the original
messages is small and zero under some special conditions.
In [12] a coding scheme is proposed (based on protection
of coding coefficients) for multi-resolution video streaming
where each client receives a number of layers of the video in
a successive refinement fashion according to its subscription
level. Therefore, the rest of layers should not be revealed to
this specific client. Our proposed coding algorithm provides
a substantial freedom to generalize the code protection based
methods to a scenario that each client is interested in an arbi-
trary subset of messages which distinguishes our work from
[11], [12] (In particular, we protect the decoding coefficients
rather than encoding coefficients). Moreover we provide a
method to update the decoding coefficients periodically which
improves secrecy.
Another important feature of our proposed scheme is its
low complexity which is a major issue due to matrix inversion
operations required to decode network coded based schemes.
This problem has been addressed in different studies such as
[13] in terms of computational power and energy consumption
limitations of wireless devices. In our method, this burden has
been shifted to the base station which often has considerably
larger computational resources and theoretically unlimited
energy than the small receiver devices. In our scheme, the
devices are only supposed to generate linear combinations of
the packets they have received over a small size finite field.
III. SYSTEM AND MODEL
We consider a set of n messages X = {x1, . . . , xn} and a
set of k clients C = {c1, . . . , ck}. Each client ci is interested
in receiving an arbitrary subset of messages χi ⊆ X from
a common base station. Each message xi is composed of T
elements each drawn from a finite field Fq of size q and is
denoted by x(t)i . For the ease of our analysis and also to reduce
the decoding complexity at the receiver side, we assume that
all the operations are done over a finite field size of 2, i.e. F2.
We consider T rounds of transmission, where at each round
1 ≤ t ≤ T , the set of elements X(t) = {x(t)1 , . . . , x
(t)
n } should
be delivered to the clients at the end of round. The set of
clients who are the privileged recipients of message xj are
denoted by Rj = {cu : xj ∈ χu}.
Each round of transmission incorporates three phases (1)
The set of elements X(t) are encoded as it will be described
later and the set of encoded elements (denoted by P (t) =
{P
(t)
1 , . . . , P
(t)
n }) are transmitted over a shared broadcast
channel to all the clients. Each client ci might receive each ele-
ment P (t)i with a probability 1−pi. (2) The missing packets by
the clients at each round should be retransmitted by the either
the base station or by the clients if the clients have received
the set of encoded elements collectively. (3) The base station
provides a set of decoding coefficients privately to each client
where each client is enabled to decode its own set of elements
but not the other ones’, therefore the secrecy of individual
messages are maintained. In the following, the three mentioned
phases are described. In section IV, a comprehensive example
is provided to illustrate the entire process.
• Broadcast Phase: At each round t, the base station gen-
erates the set of encoded elements by solving the system
of equations X(t) = A(t)P(t), where A(t) = [αij ]n×n
is a matrix of randomly chosen elements αij from the
finite field Fq, P(t) = [P (t)i ]n×1 is the vector of encoded
elements and X(t) = [x(t)i ]n×1 is the vector of message
elements at round t. The set of encoded elements P (t)
is broadcast to all the clients by the base station. To
recover a message x(t)i , a corresponding client cj for
whom xi ∈ Xj , needs the i’th row of matrix A(t) denoted
by A(t)i , as x
(t)
i = A
(t)
i P
(t)
. To prevent unprivileged
clients i.e. R¯i or any other external eavesdropper to
obtain message xi, the vector A(t)i should be delivered
privately and securely to each client cu ∈ Ri as a secret
key. The process of delivering these vectors of decoding
coefficients A(t)i to the corresponding set of privileged
clients Ri is central to this paper and will be discussed
extensively immediately in this section.
• Packet Recovery Phase: As mentioned earlier, we model
the channel between the base station and each client ci as
an erasure channel, i.e. we assume each encoded element
is received by the client ci with a probability 1 − pi.
Hence, the missing packets should be either retransmitted
by the base station or provided via cooperation among the
clients by exchanging the missing chunks of information
with each other. Detail of the network coded based
retransmission schemes is not at the scope of this paper
(We refer the reader to [6] for more information).
• Key Sharing As mentioned earlier, we need to provide
the sets of decoding coefficients privately to privileged
clients. Our method is based on a hybrid private-public
key scheme, where an initial key is associated to each
message xi. Each initial key is composed of two com-
ponents and can be represented as a pair of functions
Ki = (π
i
N˜
, κi). As the first component of the function
Ki, permutation function is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1. A permutation function of the set N˜ =
{1, . . . , n} is a one-to-one and covering function denoted by
v = πi
N˜
(u) which randomly maps each element u in N˜ to an
element v in N˜ . i is an arbitrary index which is used later to
identify the index of the corresponding message.
Definition 2. A vector permutation function maps a vector
u = [u1 . . . un] to a vector v = [v1 . . . vn] such that vj =
πi
N˜
(uj), ∀j ∈ N˜ . Also, we denote the vector [1 . . . n] by n˜.
The second component of the initial key is κi : N˜ → F2 which
maps each element j ∈ N˜ to κi(j), ∀i, j ∈ N˜ where κi(j)
has been chosen randomly from a uniform distribution over the
finite field F2 (i.e. prob(κi(j) = 1) = 12 and prob(κi(j) =
0) = 12 , ∀i, j ∈ N˜ . The initial key Ki is fixed during all the
T rounds of transmission and is privately provided to a client
cj if cj ∈ Ri. The set of initial keys can be either physically
delivered to the clients (e.g. as a part of their hardware), or
can be distributed using a method similar to [10] where it is
expected that after sufficient number of transmissions each set
of privileged clients can pick a key which has not been heard
by the others.
The base station generates a vector of n randomly chosen
elements from F2 at each round of transmission (or possibly at
the beginning of a period of multiple of transmission rounds)
denoted by ~ν(t) called as regenerating vector and broadcast
it publicly to all the clients. The decoding coefficients are
determined by this vector for all the messages from the base
station according to the following equation:
A
(t)
i = κi(π
i(n˜)) + ~ν(t) (1)
In other words, the initial key Ki acts as a function which
operates on a publicly announced input, i.e. the regenerating
vector (possibly at each round t or at the beginning of a period
of multiple of transmission rounds) to generate the vector of
decoding coefficients A(t)i . Therefore the vectors A
(t)
i can be
renewed at each round of transmission with an overhead of
n bits. However, it should be noted that the same vector ~ν(t)
is applied to initial keys of all users {K1, . . . ,Kn} at round t
(otherwise a huge amount of overhead is imposed).
The outcome of the encoding process over the messages
is broadcast to all the clients and each client ci would be
able to decode its own message by computing A(t)i P(t). In
the following, some features of the proposed system is briefly
discussed:
1) We used the linear network codes in a reverse direction,
i.e. instead of generating linear combinations of the
messages (P = AX) and broadcasting them over the
channel, a system of linear equations (X = AP)
is solved at the base station to generate packets P .
Therefore, each message is related to the set of packets
with a distinct set of decoding coefficients which enables
us to generalize the proposed method to the scenario
that each client is interested in an arbitrary subset of
messages without violating the secrecy of other clients
(As each client is provided with only the decoding
coefficients necessary for decoding the messages that
it is privileged for).
2) Reversing the direction of coding scheme mentioned in
the last item, also has the advantage that reduces the
complexity at the receiver side which might potentially
have limited power resource and computational capacity.
In our proposed scheme, the receiver only needs to com-
pute a linear combination of packets for each message
instead of inverting a matrix.
3) The role of regenerating vector is to update the decoding
coefficients to maintain the uniformity of the decoding
coefficients distribution which is necessary for our proof
as it will be discussed in section V. The role of per-
mutation functions in the initial keys is to produce a
huge space of possibilities that makes it computationally
hard to guess the decoding coefficients or obtain any
information about them. The amount of leakage of
information specially in the case of non-uniform mes-
sages is an interesting topic for further investigation (for
uniform messages some bounds and theorems have been
established in [11]). The regenerative vector updates
is expected to play a role in minimizing the leakage
of information in this case. The regenerative vector
can be updated periodically after multiple rounds of
transmissions (rather than updating at each round) but
possibly at the price of some information leakage.
IV. AN EXAMPLE
In this section, different parts of the proposed system is dis-
cussed through an example. Suppose we have four clients C =
{c1, . . . , c4} and a set of seven messages X = {x1, . . . , x7}.
Each message is composed of 64 bits, therefore we have 64
rounds of transmission t = 1, . . . , 64 where at each round one
bit from each message is transmitted to the target recipients.
We assume the sets χ1 = {x2, x4, x7}, χ2 = {x1, x3, x6},
χ3 = {x1, x2, x3, x5, x6} and χ4 = {x2, x5, x6, x7} are
demanded by clients c1, c2, c3 and c4, respectively.
Table I shows the set of initial key pairs for each message.
Now consider one round of transmission say t = 24. Suppose
the random regenerating vector produced by the base station
for this round is ~ν(24) = [1 0 0 0 1 0 0]. The base station
builds the matrix A(t) by computing the equation 1 for each
TABLE I
INITIAL KEYS
K1 pi
1
N˜
= [2 7 6 4 1 5 3] κ1 = [1 1 0 1 0 0 1]
K2 pi
2
N˜
= [4 3 5 1 2 6 7 ] κ2 = [1 1 1 0 0 1 0]
K3 pi
3
N˜
= [5 2 4 7 3 1 6 ] κ3 = [0 1 0 0 1 0 0]
K4 pi
4
N˜
= [3 1 7 6 5 4 2 ] κ4 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1]
K5 pi
4
N˜
= [2 1 6 5 7 4 3 ] κ5 = [0 1 0 1 0 1 1]
K6 pi
4
N˜
= [3 2 5 6 7 2 4 ] κ4 = [1 1 0 1 0 1 0]
K7 pi
4
N˜
= [1 3 7 5 4 2 6 ] κ4 = [1 0 1 0 1 0 1]
pair of initial keys K1, . . . ,K7 and ~ν(24) which results in:
A
(24) =


0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0


It is easy to check that det(A(24)) 6= 0. If the base station
comes up with a singular matrix, it is deleted and a new
matrix is generated. It should be mentioned that the order of
transmission of the regenerating vector and the coded data
elements (P (t)i ’s) is not important as long as it is based on a
common protocol between the sender and receivers. Therefore,
a batch of coded elements with their corresponding regenerat-
ing vectors might be packed in a packet (and the result can be
encoded using any error correction codes) and transmitted to
all the clients. For instance, P (t)i , ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , 64} and the i’th
element of all regenerating vectors ~ν(t), ∀t = 1, . . . , 64 plus
the error correction code bits can be packed as a unit packet Pi
by the protocol. Each receiver can acknowledge the reception
of each packet (here by a packet we mean the packed version
of the mentioned components) as it would be extremely costly
to send feedback for each bit and is not practical. However,
separate operations are performed over each bit according to
the corresponding decoding coefficients.
Initial keys can be distributed via any secure private channel
or by using a similar method to [10]. The basis of key sharing
method in [10] is to take the diversity of packet erasure
patterns over the downlink wireless channels between the base
station and the wireless clients as an opportunity to provide
secret keys to the corresponding clients. In [10], the base
station starts to generate random messages and broadcast it
to all the clients. If a message is received only by a client
c but not by the other ones it can be used as a key shared
between c and the base station. If a key K is shared with
client c, a message ω is encoded as x = ω ⊕ K similar
to the so-called one-time pad of Shannon [14]. If x is only
received by c but not by the other clients, then K can be
reused, otherwise K is burnt and a new key should be used
for sending the next message to c. We can use the same
approach to distribute the initial keys, but the initial keys are
not required to be renewed which substantially reduces the
the amount of transmission (and consequently increases the
throughput) at the price of relaxing the secrecy condition to
weaker one but practical yet. To apply the method of [10]
to our problem which is more general in a sense that each
client might demand an arbitrary subset of the messages, the
base station should keep transmitting random messages (of the
format Ki = (πiN˜ , κi) until a case is observed that all clients
belonging to Ri have heard it but not any of the other clients.
This might be considered very costly in terms of throughput
efficiency specially if the number of users is large, however it
should be noted that this only happens once at the beginning
and only the regenerating vector ~ν(t) is transmitted publicly
at each round afterwards. Therefore if T → ∞ the overhead
of initial key sharing will tend to zero. However, as mentioned
earlier, the initial keys can be shared using any type of secret
key management method.
As mentioned earlier, the packet recovery can be accom-
plished either by the base station or via cooperation. In [6], we
assumed that the operations are done over a large field size and
some elements of each row Ai might have been set to be zero.
Therefore each needs to send a negative acknowledgement
(NACK) for those packets which have not received and need
them according to Ai. As the operations are done over field
size 2 in this paper, if a client sends a NACK only for
those packets in its wants set which are not received, some
entries in Ai would be disclosed which violates the secrecy.
Therefore, each client should send a NACK for all its missing
packets. Then the packets can be recovered using the methods
developed in [2], [4], [15], [16] for retransmission via the base
station or via cooperative data exchange [17]–[19].
V. PROOF OF SECRECY
In this section we prove that the aforementioned scheme in
section III is weakly secure in an information theoretic sense.
The concept of weakly security introduced in [9] implies
that an unprivileged party can not obtain any meaningful
information about a message intended for a group of privileged
users. Weakly security relaxes the perfect secrecy condition
(which does not allow any information to be leaked to an
unauthorized party) to a weaker but more practical condition
of security [9].
Consider the set of transmitted packets P (t) and also let
G ⊆ X(t). We assume each client has only received the set
of keys which is privileged for, i.e. ci or any other external
eavesdropper E does not hold Kj if ci /∈ Rj . The following
theorem states the main result of this paper (assuming the
regenerating vector is updated at each round):
Theorem 1. An unprivileged client for packet xi or any
external eavesdropper E can not obtain any information
about any individual message x(t)i , i.e. I(x
(t)
i ;P
(t)|G) = 0,
assuming that E initially holds G and x(t)i /∈ G.
Before proving the theorem a few lemmas are proven
or stated. The first lemma proved by Gallager is borrowed
from [20]–[22] where the probability distribution of a linear
combination of random variables over a finite field is studied.
Lemma 1. Let β1, . . . , βn ∈ GF (2) be random variables over
the field with prob(βi = 1) = δi1, and let m1, . . . ,mn ∈
GF (2). Then the probability distribution of the linear combi-
nation s =
⊕n
i=1miβi is computed as follows:
Prob(s = 1) =
1−
∏n
i=0(1 − 2δi1)
2
,
P rob(s = 0) = 1− Prob(s = 1)
(2)
Lemma 2. Suppose that A∗ = [α∗ij ]n×n is a matrix of random
elements α∗ij ∈ F2, where prob(α∗ij = 1) = prob(α∗ij = 0) =
1
2 , ∀i, j ∈ n˜. Let X
∗ = A∗P ∗ be a system of linear equations
for known vector X∗ = [x∗1 . . . x∗n] and the vector of unknowns
P ∗ = [p∗1 . . . p
∗
n]. Then if the system is rewritten in the form
Xˆ = AˆP ∗ using Gaussian elimination method, where Aˆ =
[αˆij ]n×n is an upper triangular matrix, assuming the last entry
p∗n written in the form γn1x∗1 + · · ·+ γnnx∗n, then prob(γni =
1) = prob(γni = 0) =
1
2 .
Proof. To transform the matrix A∗ to an upper triangular
matrix Aˆ, row and column operations are applied to A∗ in
a way that at the end of the elimination process, all entries
αij = 0, ∀j < i − 1. Depending on the value of the element
(ℓ, i), row j ≥ i is added to row ℓ with probability 12 (if
the element (ℓ, i) is 1, otherwise no action is required for
this element which happens with probability 12 ). It should
be noted that all the rows ℓˆ that i < ℓˆ < ℓ might have
been affected by the row i with probability 12 (by affected
we mean that row i has been added to row ℓˆ). Therefore, in
the last round of elimination process to remove each element
(n, j < n), one of the previous rows might be added to the
row n which the row j might be affect even or odd number of
times by the row i < j with equal probabilities (the proof is
of equal probabilities is based on considering all possibilities
of being affected by a previous row and is removed due to
space limitations). Even number of being affected by the i’th
row updates the coefficient γni to be zero and odd number of
being affected by the i’th row ends up with γni = 1. Therefore
prob(γni = 1) = prob(γni = 0) =
1
2 .
Now the proof of Theorem 1 is established using Lemma 1
and Lemma 2.
Proof. It is easy to show that p[κi(πi(n0)) = 1] + ~ν(t) = 12 .
as the regenerating vector is assumed to be drawn from a
uniform distribution. Therefore the elements of A(t) would
have a uniform distribution over F2. Using lemma 2, it is
showed that each packet P (t)i (which can be considered as
the last element of A∗ by swapping the rows) can be written
in the form γi1x∗1 + · · · + γinx∗n (if the matrix A(t) is not
singular), where prob(γnj = 1) = prob(γnj = 0) = 12 .
Consequently, using lemma 1, it is proven that prob(P (t)i =
1) = prob(P
(t)
i = 0) =
1
2 . Therefore, each packet is
independent of any individual message x(t)j . Hence, it can be
concluded that I(x(t)i ;P (t)|G) = 0.
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